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1DISPUTE RESOLUTION OUTSIDE OF COURTS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
AND DECISION ACCEPTANCE AMONG USERS OF OMBUDS1 SERVICES 
IN THE UK
Naomi Creutzfeldt2 and Ben Bradford3
Abstract
Attitudes towards legal authorities based on theories of procedural justice have been 
explored extensively in the criminal and civil justice systems. This has provided 
considerable empirical evidence concerning the importance of trust and legitimacy in 
generating cooperation, compliance and decision acceptance. However, not enough 
attention has been paid to attitudes towards institutions of informal dispute resolution. 
This paper asks whether the theory of procedural justice applies to the alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) context, focusing on ombuds services. What are the 
predictors of perceptions of procedural justice during the process of dealing with an 
ombuds, and what factors shape outcome acceptance? These questions are analyzed 
using a sample of recent ombuds users. The results indicate that outcome favorability 
is highly correlated with perceived procedural justice, and both predict decision 
acceptance. 
1
 The term ombuds is chosen here as a gender neutral term to describe public and private organisations 
that deal with people’s complaints about public bodies and businesses, outside of the courts, in the UK. 
We did not, however, change the names of the ‘ombudsmen’ bodies in the UK.
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2Introduction
This paper contributes to the literature on procedural justice by applying it to a new 
context—ombuds services. The ombuds, an established form of alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR), is an important pathway to redress outside of the national court 
system in many countries around the world. Despite being a well-established 
institution in the public sector, the ombuds has only developed in the private sector 
over the past 20 years. As such, the ombuds landscape is an understudied area. In 
particular, little is known about people’s expectations of—and satisfaction with— 
ombuds services; in fact, before now no comparable data across different services has 
been available. This paper contributes towards filling this void with what is, to our 
knowledge, a unique dataset—a survey of recent users of ombuds services. Through 
this data we are able to advance understanding of people’s attitudes towards this form 
of ADR and explore the factors that shape acceptance of the outcomes ombuds 
provide. Using Tyler’s procedural justice model as a lens through which to view the 
data, our analysis provides valuable insight not only for building and expanding the 
existing procedural justice literature, but also for informing policy decisions in this 
area. 
Justice systems vary considerably and each jurisdiction has its own approach 
to defining how people can legally resolve disputes. This provides both challenges 
and opportunities for access to justice. The concept of access to justice has a number 
of nuances; however, on a principal level the aim is to ensure effective access to an 
independent dispute resolution mechanism. In this context ADR is an additional 
pathway to resolve disputes without invoking formal processes of law, and the 
ombuds is the most established model of ADR in Europe. Indeed, the institution has 
become increasingly popular over recent decades, to the point where it is now a 
3highly significant and permanent feature of legal systems in many parts of the world, 
with many countries having both public sector and private sector ombuds. European 
Union (EU) level requirements for member states to have ADR bodies in place to 
ensure consumer protection (ADR directive4 and ODR regulation5) are a high priority. 
The ombuds landscape throughout EU member states presents a variety of 
institutional and jurisdictional arrangements, operational styles and decision-making 
processes (Creutzfeldt, N, 2013; Hodges and Creutzfeldt, 2013; Hodges et al., 2012), 
though in this paper we concentrate on just one set of services, those operating in the 
United Kingdom. 
Despite the significance of ombuds to European constitutional and civil justice 
landscapes, little is known about users’ perceptions of the fairness of procedures and 
the significance of these perceptions for legitimacy and decision acceptance within 
this context. Research into these issues is particularly timely due to the current 
emphasis within UK government policy on saving money in the administration of 
justice—specifically by avoiding the courts and focusing on alternative pathways 
toward dispute resolution. Further, the UK government plans to merge existing public 
sector ombuds into a unified ombudsman model6, which makes this research highly 
relevant for both public and private sector ombuds. In this paper we concentrate on 
the question of decision acceptance, exploring what motivates people to accept the 
decisions of ombuds.
4
 Directive 2013/11 O.J. 2013 L 165/63 and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 
2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR) O.J. 2009 L 110/30.
5
 Regulation (EU) 524/2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR) O.J.
L 165/1.
6https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/public-service-ombudsman
4Ombuds services in the UK
Ombuds deal with complaints from ordinary citizens and consumers about 
most public bodies, and the provision of goods and services in the private sector (e.g. 
telecoms, financial services, energy). The underlying purpose behind the creation of 
ombuds services was an attempt to even out the power imbalance between the 
individual and the state, and between the individual and a business. The services 
provided by ombuds are free of charge to citizens, meaning that ombuds are 
accessible to individuals who could not afford a court case. Different ombuds have 
different mandates and, within those mandates, different powers. Crucially, they are 
impartial and independent from the public body or business under their jurisdiction. 
Public sector ombuds are funded through public funds, while private sector ombuds 
are funded through a combination of public funds and businesses’ membership fees. 
Typically, they deal with individual cases but can also undertake investigations into 
multiple complaints about the same problem. Ideally, ombuds aim to find solutions to 
complaints without having to resort to formal investigations (public sector) or 
recommendations (private sector).
A private sector ombuds has the power to issue binding decisions on 
businesses under their jurisdiction (i.e. their members). Public ombuds, on the other 
hand, have only the power to make non-binding recommendations to the public 
bodies complained about. Despite this difference, it has been noted that ‘in essence an 
industry ombudsman pursues many of the same objectives as their pubic law 
counterpart and is subject to many of the same advantages and criticisms’ (Stuhmcke 
1998). Both public and private ombuds provide a dispute resolution service that is 
made up of different stages, and an ombuds can provide a range of ADR techniques to 
help the consumer and the business, or the citizen and the public body, to come to an 
5agreement (Creutzfeldt 2014). The aim of an ombuds process is to provide an 
accessible, fast, free, and fair process for the consumer to get redress. Most cases are 
resolved at an early stage through intervention by the ombuds between the individual 
and the business (private sector) or a government agency (public sector). As noted 
though, in some cases the ombuds goes beyond the negotiator or mediator role, and 
can issue binding decisions. Anecdotally, the ombuds report a high compliance rate 
with their recommendations from companies or public bodies (even when they are not 
binding). There are a number of advantages to the ombuds model: the consumer is 
provided with expert information and advice about his/her rights, the company or 
public body can learn from the complaints and improve their services, and as the 
ombuds work closely with regulators they can inform them of systemic problems. If 
the consumer is not happy with the outcome of the ombuds procedure, the option to 
take their case to a court is open (ECHR Art6). In other words, the dispute can 
continue in another forum.
Overall, ombuds services in the EU attract millions of claims per year by 
addressing those grievances that citizens have against government and state 
institutions and those that consumers have in relation to specific businesses (e.g. 
banks and energy companies). In the UK and Ireland alone, there are 34 ombuds 
across public and private sectors (Ombudsman Association members7). Their 
workloads vary significantly. There were 16,341 complaints and enquiries in relation 
to the provision of NHS health services in 2012/13 (Parliamentary and Health Service 
Ombudsman, 2012/13), compared with over 1 million cases and enquiries in relation 
to financial services (Financial Ombudsman Services, 2012/13). Table 1 provides an 
overview of the ombuds services studied in this paper.
7
 The Ombudsman Association (http://www.ombudsmanassociation.org). 
6A central distinction between public and private sector ombuds is the nature of 
the complaints they deal with (see table 1). This is an important aspect to take into 
consideration when evaluating user interaction with and acceptance of ombuds 
decisions. An individual who approaches an ombuds who looks after a private sector 
concern, such as telecoms, would seem, prima facie, to be less likely to have an 
emotional engagement with the issues concerned than users of public sectors services, 
which deal with political, governmental and health-related issues (for example the 
overwhelming majority of UK citizens use the state-funded National Health Service 
as their primary—and in most cases sole—healthcare provider, and thus have direct 
personal and often emotional links with this institution). Typically, complaints raised 
to a public sector ombuds are complex, involving longstanding issues within which 
many parties are entangled. A further distinction is that users of a public sector 
ombuds may feel a sense of entitlement in relation to a service financed by taxpayers 
(i.e. themselves) as compared to one funded by private industry (i.e. a private sector 
ombuds). Lastly, the ombuds model has been an established part of the public sector’s 
complaints machinery for many years, so people have a clearer set of expectations, 
while private sector ADR is now regulated through EU wide measures. 
Table 1 about here
This paper is based on the dataset collected for a study: Trusting the middle – man: 
impact and legitimacy of ombudsmen in Europe. The research objective of this three-
7year project (2013-2016)8 was to compare levels of engagement and trust in ombuds 
systems in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. With that objective in mind, 
research questions aimed to elicit data that would show (1) what citizens expect from, 
and how they engage with, the ombuds complaints processes in each country; (2) the 
extent to which ombuds explain their decisions and thereby engage in the process.
This research will improve understanding of how the ombuds process is 
perceived by its users. The research objective is achieved by collecting qualitative and 
quantitative data in a cross-country and cross-sector comparison. This project 
provides important data and creates a knowledge base, which will be directly relevant 
to the development of policies at national and EU level, and inform multiple networks 
of policy-making. 
The project’s methodology has been primarily based on collecting data by 
sending out surveys to users of public and private ombuds through the ombuds 
themselves. The total number of responses from the three countries is just over 3,000. 
For the purpose of this paper, the UK dataset (1,306 responses) is analyzed. People 
have various ways to access an ombuds: These include the telephone, letter/fax, email 
and the Internet, through a third party, and, in some cases, face-to-face. The main 
channels of correspondence with an ombuds, as reported by UK respondents, were 
email (47%) and phone (31 %), with 6.5% choosing letter or fax. The majority of the 
sample respondents stated that they were very / fairly happy with the method of 
communication. The reported expected duration of a case was between one and three 
months, with the actual duration of a case longer than three months for two ombuds in 
the sample.
8
 This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number 
ES/K00820X/1] https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/projects/Ombudsmen.
8This paper contributes to the existing body of literature on procedural justice 
and expands it to the ombuds institution. Little is known about how this group of 
ombuds users perceives the processes by which decisions are made and what drives 
their decision acceptance. For clarity, in this context we are talking about the 
acceptance of the substantive outcome rather than acceptance of the ombuds 
procedure itself. Here our data allows for a comparison between public and private 
ombuds. Further, we take a closer look into the significance of users’ expectations and 
the emotional engagement with private and public ombuds. These distinctions 
between public and private ombuds are made to explore our hypothesis on procedural 
justice effects. 
Procedural justice 
The theory of procedural justice seeks to explain what motivates people to cooperate 
and comply with authorities in group settings. The body of literature that has grown 
up around procedural justice originated in experimental research in social psychology, 
which investigated the influence of decision evaluation on outcome acceptance 
(Thibaut and Walker 1975). Adding concepts from sociology, economics and political 
science, Tyler (1990) produced the now widely accepted argument that people do not 
only comply with laws and regulations through fear of punishment or self-interested 
motives. Rather, the legitimacy of legal authorities also has a role to play, and those 
who consider the police and courts more legitimate are, for a number of reasons, more 
likely to obey the law (Jackson et al. 2012). Procedural justice theory has been tested 
most comprehensively in policing (Bradford et al. 2013; Tyler and Huo 2002; Tyler 
and Folger 1980), courts (Lind, et al 1980) and organizational settings (Brockner and 
Wiesenfeld 1996; Greenberg and Folger 1983; Hofstede 1980; Tyler and Blader 2003; 
92009). 
The main focus of this work has been to discover what criteria people use to 
assess the fairness of a procedure, and why they comply willingly with authorities 
(and with the law) and accept their decisions (Tyler 1988; 1990). A key claim is that 
compliance can be explained, in part, by incorporation of the values of law into 
people’s own value systems. This process is encouraged by the experience of 
procedural justice at the hands of authority figures who represent and embody those 
laws: police officers, judges and other legal actors. Procedural justice is demonstrated 
and communicated by fair, honest, and transparent decision-making, and decent, 
respectful interpersonal interactions that allow people a voice in the processes 
affecting them.
It is important to note, however, that people’s values of law are formed not 
only through their direct experience with an authority, but also through longstanding 
and conditioned learning. As such, we all have a concept of a justice system, of which 
the courts and police are a significant part. Furthermore, we all have an understanding 
and acceptance of these institutions as representative of legal authority that 
corresponds with a set of beliefs about how they should behave (Tapp and Kohlberg, 
1971). Processes of legal socialization develop a set of beliefs or expectations 
concerning fairness, dignity and respect, and the importance of legal authorities 
keeping within well-established boundaries of probity and legality (Trinkner and 
Cohn, 2014). These beliefs or expectations condition the way the behavior of legal 
authorities is experienced and interpreted and may explain, in part, why people place 
so much emphasis on procedural justice during their interactions with legal 
authorities.
Two further concepts provide important ‘bridging’ mechanisms between 
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procedural justice and compliance, decision acceptance and other ‘outcomes’ of 
procedural justice. First, the legitimacy of a legal authority is enhanced when it acts in 
a procedurally just manner; when people hold a legal authority legitimate they are 
motivated to follow the norms and laws it mandates and enforces, and to abide by its 
decisions (Tyler 1990; Jackson et al, 2012). Second, when an authority figure (e.g. a 
police officer) treats a subordinate (i.e. ordinary citizen) in a procedurally fair manner, 
they encourage in that subordinate a feeling of shared group membership and sense of 
affiliation with the superordinate group the authority represents. This in turn promotes 
pro-social behavior such as cooperation and compliance (Bradford et al. 2014; 
Murphy et al 2016).
Procedural justice research in the dispute resolution setting
Much procedural justice research has focused on translating the procedural justice 
model developed by Tyler and colleagues to different social contexts, regulatory 
regimes and countries. In the context of dispute resolution, Thibaut & Walker (1975) 
noted long ago that litigants’ satisfaction with decisions is influenced by their 
judgments about the fairness of the dispute resolution process. This has been widely 
supported by subsequent studies in different settings (Lind and Earley, 1992; Lind and 
Tyler, 1988): on legal trial procedures (Lind et al 1980), non-trial procedures( Casper, 
Tyler & Fisher 1988), in mediation (Lind et al. 1990), and in organizational (Brockner 
and Wiesenfeld, 1996; Greenberg & Tyler 1987), political (Tyler & Caine 1981), 
interpersonal (Barrett-Howard & Tyler 1986), and educational settings (Tyler & 
Caine 1981). There is a widespread suggestion that those affected by the decisions of 
third parties in both formal and informal contexts react to the procedural justice of the 
decision-making process at least as much, and often more, than they react to the 
decision itself (Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler 1996).
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Moreover, despite the fact that ADR procedures are substantially different 
from police and court procedures (i.e. inquisitorial by nature; aiming for a settlement 
as outcome rather than a judgment; not bound by formal rules; and more flexible and 
informal than many criminal justice procedures (Bercovitch & Houston 1985)), 
research has shown that ADR ‘disputants [who] have feelings of control and fairness, 
perceive the procedures and solutions to have greater legitimacy, and are more likely 
to comply with the terms of the conflict resolution decision’ (Welsh, 2002).
When trying to understand people’s perceptions of an ombuds procedure then, 
fairness and decision acceptance are likely to be significant indicators. People are 
responsive to evaluations of the fairness of procedures, even if authorities do not 
provide the outcomes they hoped for (Tyler and Huo 2002), and there is empirical 
evidence that people will accept an adverse outcome if the procedure was experienced 
as fair (Lind and Tyler, 1988). This, at least in part, is because the experience of fair 
process enhances the legitimacy of the authority involved (Tyler, 2003). Following 
Tyler’s model, we therefore assume in this paper that procedural justice will prove 
important and be applicable to the context dispute resolution settings that involve 
ombuds. If people perceive ombuds procedures to be fair, this will build the 
legitimacy of the institution and motivate decision acceptance.
Several questions arise from this basic proposition, however. First, will the 
association between procedural justice, legitimacy and outcomes such as decision 
acceptance be as strong in this context as it often seems to be in relation to the police 
and courts? The procedural justice model focuses on non-instrumental motivators of 
compliance and decision acceptance, and suggests that procedural justice is more 
important than outcome favorability for improving perceptions of legitimacy. A key 
claim in terms of decision acceptance is that people care, on average, more about the 
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way a decision was reached than about its substantive content, and, moreover, that 
they are more likely to accept even unfavorable decisions if they feel they were 
reached in a procedurally fair way. As noted above, the extent to which people have, 
due to processes of legal socialization, internalized values of fairness may be a key 
factor in explaining these patterns—people expect legal authorities to behave fairly 
and are intensely attuned to behaviors that communicate fairness (or unfairness). 
To turn to the subject of this paper, however, this understanding of the nature 
and role of the legal system, and the processes of socialization that inculcate it, may 
not apply to an ombuds, even though the model has been a longstanding part of 
justice systems around the world. There is generally a low level of awareness and use 
of the ombuds system (even in the public sector)—people do not necessarily know 
who ombuds are or what they do, and they may lack a well-developed sense of how 
ombuds should behave or the outcomes they can work to secure. Although our 
empirical data has little to say one way or the other in relation to this claim, we 
speculate that this is a likely result of a lack of familiarity with the ombuds model. 
This raises questions as to where ombuds are situated within people’s value 
systems, and whether norms of procedural justice figure as prominently in people’s 
evaluations of ombuds behavior as they do in, for example, their evaluations of the 
behavior of police officers. On a more fundamental level, the type of procedure under 
consideration may have an impact on people’s perceptions of its fairness, and on 
which aspects of the process figure most prominently in their assessments of it 
(Leung, K and Lind, A, 1986; Lind and Earley, 1992). It may simply be that people 
conceive of their interactions with ombuds in a different way to their interactions with 
more established legal authorities, such as police officers and judges, who, not 
coincidently, wield far greater symbolic and literal power over them. We might 
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speculate, then, that the modal interaction between members of the public and an 
ombuds service will be more transactional in nature than that between a citizen and a 
police officer or court official. Many people who contact ombuds services wish 
simply to get a refund from a goods or service provider they feel has not lived up to 
expectations (see Table 3 below). Given this, might the legitimacy of the ombuds 
have a different set of pre-conditions, given that people may approach the ombuds not 
for justice but for a purely instrument instrumental return (‘getting their money 
back’).  Studies within the procedural justice literature regularly contrast instrumental 
against affective or relational ‘drivers’ of legitimacy, decision acceptance and other 
outcomes, and most conclude that affective, process-based concerns are, on average, 
more important. However, will this be the case in the current context where many 
contacts with ombuds will have been generated directly by the experience of financial 
loss? Might people in this context be more concerned with the outcome they receive 
than with the process by which it was determined?
Second, recall that on most accounts the reason why procedural justice is so 
important to people is that it communicates shared group membership. Police officers, 
judges and other legal authorities (and also employers) represent social categories that 
many people find important, and by their behavior these authority figures can 
communicate messages either of inclusion, status and belonging, or of exclusion and 
denigration, within these social categories. Since most people desire positive 
messages concerning status and belonging—which help provide for and reinforce 
their sense of self—they are highly attentive to the identity-relevant aspects of others’ 
behavior, and particularly if the ‘other’ is a figure of authority. Indeed, it is partly 
because procedural justice strengthens the social bonds between authorities and 
subordinates that it is thought to be so closely linked to legitimacy, cooperation, 
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decision acceptance and compliance (e.g. Bradford et al. 2014; Tyler and Blader 
2000). The question arises, therefore, as to whether ombuds represent a social 
category with which people feel an association, and which they feel is important. If 
ombuds do not have this representational quality then the association between 
procedural justice and legitimacy, and the outcomes of that association (such as 
decision acceptance) may be weaker than is commonly found elsewhere. A further 
complication is that people may draw a distinction between the public and private 
services. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest, for example, that public ombuds 
services might be more closely linked to the state and thus superordinate identities of 
the kind also associated with the police and courts. Private ombuds, however, may 
lack such associations since, for example, they are not funded by taxation, in which 
case the fairness of their activity may be less identity-relevant to users of their 
services.
Third, by definition all those using ombuds services felt strongly enough about 
their situation to make contact in order to seek some kind of restitution, whether 
financial, an apology, or the opportunity to have their voice heard in relation to their 
complaint. Although, as noted above, people’s emotional engagement with a 
complaint brought to a public ombuds is often far higher than a private one, users of 
both public and private ombuds are likely to enter into the interaction expecting a 
particular outcome to transpire. However, these expectations concern a situation and 
procedure about which the individual knows relatively little (due to the general lack 
of knowledge of ombuds services). By contrast many people who have contact with 
the police and even courts—for example witnesses, those contacted for information 
more generally, those interacting with police during crowd events or simply during 
their day-to-day lives—may have less at stake in the outcome of the encounter or 
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procedure, may well not have initiated it themselves, and may not expect a particular 
outcome. Others, of course—notably victims, those making various forms of 
complaint, and offenders—have much at stake and may expect a particular outcome. 
What all will have, however, is a strong set of expectations about how they should be 
treated by legal authorities, derived from the process of legal socialization outlined 
above.
That people using ombuds may have a clear outcome expectation but an 
unclear process expectation has two potential implications. On the one hand, outcome 
expectation may moderate the association between procedural justice and outcome 
acceptance. Most obviously, those who simply want their money back may place less 
weight on issues of procedural justice (i.e. care less about the quality of the process 
than its outcome); conversely, those who wished for an apology or the opportunity to 
have their voice heard may place more weight on issues of procedural justice, 
precisely because these give them voice.9 There is evidence in support of the latter 
possibility; for example, van den Bos et al. (1997) found that people who expected to 
have their voice heard at the beginning of a process placed more emphasis on this 
aspect of procedural justice than those who did not expect to have voice in the 
process.10
On the other hand, it may be that in the ombuds context procedural justice and 
outcome favorability are closely intertwined. Much research in other contexts 
suggests that perceptions of procedural justice tend to predict perceptions of outcomes 
(Lind and Tyler 1988). That is, people are inclined to believe their outcome was fair 
9
 Here we expect a distinction between public and private ombudsmen users due to the different type of 
complaints they bring.
10
 The literature on non-legal or extra legal contexts such as workplace dispute resolution does not 
apply to the studied ombuds in this paper, as we are not looking at the ombuds as a workplace, rather 
we are looking at their interactions with the public. 
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and/or favorable if they feel the process by which it was arrived at was fair. This 
process may be particularly important in the context of ombuds; indeed, for those 
using the service to ‘have their say’ process and outcome may collapse into one 
another (since ‘fair’ and ‘favorable’ outcomes are likely to be largely 
indistinguishable, at least from the viewpoint of participants). Yet, equally, the 
unfamiliarity of the ombuds service may mean that outcome favorability predicts 
perceptions of procedural justice to a greater extent than in other contexts. When 
people are unsure about how a process will function they may use the perceived 
fairness of the outcome to assess the fairness of the procedure (van den Bos 1997). In 
other words, there may be a particularly strong bi-directional relationship between 
process and outcome fairness in the context of ombuds services that would imply that 
perceptions of procedural justice do not only predict perceptions of the outcome, but 
that perceptions of the procedure are also shaped by perceptions of the outcome 
achieved.
Why does procedural justice motivate outcome acceptance – the role of 
legitimacy
Tyler differentiates between instrumental and normative models of 
cooperation, decision-acceptance and compliance with the law (Tyler 2011). This 
paper takes both models into consideration. The instrumental model is premised on 
the idea that individuals respond to legal and administrative processes in a self-
interested way, such that decision acceptance (for example) is motivated by reward 
(in our case a monetary procedural outcome). The normative model of process-based 
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regulation is premised on concepts of personal morality and legitimacy.11According to 
this approach (most commonly described in the context of policing), the fairness of 
procedures that people experience have both immediate and long-term effects on their 
behaviors and perceptions. In particular, evaluations of the legitimacy of an institution 
are shaped by perceptions of the fairness of its procedures—more specifically, the 
quality of interpersonal treatment and the quality of decision-making. Tyler has 
persuasively argued that when people feel that an institution is legitimate they are 
more likely to accept its decisions not because they stand to gain from them but 
because they think that accepting the decisions of legitimate authorities is the right 
thing to do. Following this argument, legitimacy is won and lost partly through the 
experience of procedural justice and injustice, and this process can have important 
implications for outcomes such as decision acceptance. Moreover, while instrumental 
concerns, for example about the effectiveness of an institution, are also likely to be 
important in shaping legitimacy and various outcomes, primacy is usually accorded to 
procedural justice.
If people feel that the institution is legitimate, then, they are more inclined to 
feel an obligation towards it and a responsibility to cooperate with it. They are also 
more likely to accept its decisions, not least because these are experienced as ‘right 
and proper’ when handed down by a legitimate authority (Tyler and Rasinski 1991; 
Tyler 2003; but see also Gibson and Caldeira 2003). This suggests that legitimacy as 
well as procedural justice needs to be taken into account in any study examining 
people’s responses to the decisions handed down by legal and quasi-legal authorities. 
There is, however, significant debate in criminological (and particularly policing) 
literature on how legitimacy should be conceptualized and measured (Bottoms and 
11
 Hinsch (2008) distinguishes between normative (or objective) legitimacy and empirical (or 
subjective) legitimacy. This study is interested in public’s perceptions and therefore focuses on the 
empirical concept of legitimacy.
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Tankebe 2012; Gau 2011; Jackson and Gau (forthcoming); Reisig et al. 2007; 
Tankebe 2013; Tyler and Jackson 2013). There are two important strands to this 
debate.
The first strand concerns the conceptual content of legitimacy. While most 
current work concurs that legitimacy is a multi-dimensional construct, there is 
disagreement as to what these different dimensions are. Most conceptualizations start 
with perceived duty to obey, envisioning that an authority can be considered 
legitimate when those subordinate to it willingly obey and defer to it, where such 
obedience is experienced by individuals as stemming from a sense of moral duty 
toward the authority (Tyler and Jackson 2014; Jackson et al. 2012a). To this ‘core’ 
tends to be added either (a) institutional trust (such that legitimacy can be considered 
to be present when and to the extent that people believe an authority wields its power 
appropriately and effectively); and/or (b) ‘normative alignment’, that is, people’s 
sense that the authority operates according to a moral framework they themselves 
share. On this account, legitimacy is granted or withheld on the basis of judgments 
people make about the alignment between their own norms and values and those of 
the authority concerned (see Jackson and Gau, forthcoming, for a review of these 
issues).
By contrast Tankebe (2013) has recently argued that duty to obey is an 
outcome of legitimacy rather than constitutive of it, and that the legitimacy of the 
police, at least, is comprised of public perceptions of procedural fairness, distributive 
fairness (or outcome justice), effectiveness, and lawfulness (or legality). This latter 
approach, however, can be criticized for conflating the pre-conditions of legitimacy—
of which all four elements just listed are important components—with legitimacy 
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itself, undermining conceptual clarity and diminishing the explanatory power of the 
concept (Hough et al. 2013).
The second strand of debate revolves around issues of measurement. While 
research has conceptualized and measured procedural justice and legitimacy as 
separate constructs, some recent studies have pointed out that the scales and measures 
often used can suffer from poor convergent and particularly discriminant validity 
(Gau 2011; 2014; Jackson 2015; Jackson and Gau, forthcoming; Reisig et al. 2007). 
These issues seem most acute when institutional trust is included in legitimacy scales 
and, briefly, it seems that procedural justice and institutional trust are often so highly 
correlated with each other it can make little sense to think of them as separate ‘things’ 
(distinct psychological constructs). To the extent that this is true, and when measures 
of institutional trust are included in legitimacy scales, it becomes difficult to claim 
procedural justice ‘causes’ legitimacy, since both seem to be part of the same 
construct. This compromises an important link in the chain leading from procedural 
justice to legitimacy and on, for example, to decision acceptance.
In this paper we conceptualize legitimacy via a composite of this recent work 
within criminology. Specifically, we follow others in drawing on the work of David 
Beetham (1991) and Jackson et al. (2012) to suggest that, in the context of ombuds 
services, legitimacy can be considered as having three distinct components. We 
suggest that an ombuds can be considered legitimate when users of the service feel (1) 
a moral obligation to obey the decisions of this authority; (2) that it is acting in a 
lawful manner; and (3) that it operates according to a normative framework they 
themselves share. This conceptualization therefore taps into the idea that institutional 
legitimacy is the right to rule and the recognition by the ruled of that right (Bottoms 
and Tankebe 2012; Coicaud 2002; Tyler 2006). Legitimacy can be said to be present 
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in a relationship of governance when: (1) The ‘governed’ offer their willing consent 
to defer to the authority concerned, where such consent is grounded on (2) the 
authority’s conformity to standards of legality (acting according to the law) and (3) on 
a degree of ‘normative alignment’ between power holders and the governed, 
reflecting shared moral values.
Hypothesis 
The discussion above can be distilled into a set of hypotheses to be tested against data 
from a survey of recent users of ombuds services. We focus on the issue of decision 
acceptance, and ask what motivates people to accept the decision made by the 
ombuds in their case. Are procedural concerns about the fairness of the ombuds’ 
actions uppermost in people’s minds, as the procedural justice model would suggest, 
or are users of these services more concerned with the instrumental outcome they 
receive? Hypotheses 1 and 2 relate to the ‘standard’ procedural justice model (see for 
example Tyler and Huo, 2002: 82 ff), while the remainder relate to issues raised by 
applying this model to a  new context.
Hypothesis 1 is that perceptions of procedural justice are associated with decision 
acceptance. Those who experience the ombuds as more procedurally fair will be more 
likely to accept the decision reached in their case.
Hypothesis 2 is that part of the reason why procedural justice promotes decision 
acceptance is that it enhances the legitimacy of the ombuds.
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Hypothesis 3 is that outcome favorability shapes decision acceptance—those who 
receive a favorable outcome will be more likely to accept the decision than those who 
do not.
Hypothesis 4 posits that the importance of procedural justice as a predictor of 
decision acceptance varies according to what people expect from the process. For 
example, procedural fairness will be more important to those who wanted to have 
their voice heard (hypothesis 4a), and less important to those who wanted reward or 
refund (hypothesis 4b). 
Hypothesis 5 is that procedural justice will be more strongly associated with decision 
acceptance among users of public ombuds services. Because public ombuds more 
clearly represent a superordinate social category to which most people feel some sort 
of affiliation (the state), the identity-relevant aspects of their behavior should be more 
salient to users of their services.
Finally, Hypothesis 6 is that in this particular context the association between 
perceptions of procedural justice and process outcome will be stronger than is usually 
the case in more overtly criminal justice contexts. Respondents who receive a 
favorable outcome will be more likely to think the process fair, and vice versa.
Methods and data
The data for this study are taken from a larger dataset of just under 3,000 recent users 
of ombuds, in several sectors, across three countries. We designed a survey and 
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structured it according to shared stages in a consumer’s complaint journey through an 
ombuds system: initial contact, the procedure, the outcome, the overall experience. 
We included measures of procedural justice and legitimacy through which we could 
elicit data about outcome acceptance.
The focus of this paper, the UK dataset, is made up of responses from recent 
users of two public sector ombuds (PHSO12, LGO13) and three consumer ombuds 
(OS14, LeO15, FOS16). The results of 1,712 surveys provide the data for the analysis 
(representing a response rate of 17%). Unresolved cases, and those from a smaller 
service that returned very few responses (four overall) were excluded from the 
analysis, resulting in a final sample size of 1,306. The sample used for this paper 
consists of 67% male respondents and 33% female, the average age of respondents 
was 59 years old. Some 41% were employed, 34 % retired and 65% had a degree.
The people in the survey made judgments about procedural justice and other 
factors after they had been exposed to the ombuds procedure. Outcome acceptance 




The primary response variable represented respondents’ willingness to accept the 
outcome of their case. A single item measure was used, taken from a survey question 
that asked “Were you willing to accept the outcome?”. Responses were on a five-
12
 Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (http://www.ombudsman.org.uk)
13
 Local Government Ombudsman (http://www.lgo.org.uk)
14
 Ombudsman Services (http://www.ombudsman-services.org)
15
 Legal Ombudsman (http://www.legalombudsman.org.uk)
16
 Financial Ombudsman Service (http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk)
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category, Likert-type scale, ranging from ‘Very willing’ to ‘Very unwilling’. Since 
we are concerned with what predicts acceptance of the outcomes provided by the 
ombuds services, responses on this item were collapsed to generate a new binary 
variable, outcome acceptance, coded one if the respondent was ‘very’ or ‘fairly 
willing’ to accept the outcome and zero if they were ‘neither willing or unwilling’, 
‘fairly unwilling’ or ‘very unwilling’. What is at stake here, then, is the subjective 
state of mind of the respondent – when asked, did they feel that they were willing to 
accept the decision reached?
Explanatory variables
Explanatory variables included four scales generated and validated via Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis (CFA) in the statistical package Mplus 7.11. These represented, first, 
the extent to which the respondent contacted the ombuds service because they wanted 
fairness from the process. This construct was measured by survey items that tapped 
into whether respondents decided to complain to the ombuds because they wanted an 
apology, someone to listen to them and/or to be treated with dignity and respect (all 
used a five category Likert-type response scale).
The second scale represented respondents’ perceptions of the procedural 
fairness of the ombud’s staff with whom they first had contact (this will be an 
important explanatory variable when we come to address hypothesis 6). Items used 
here covered issues such as helpfulness, understanding, respect and neutrality; all 
used binary yes/no response categories.
The third scale measured respondents’ perceptions of the procedural justice of 
the ombuds service as a whole, with items tapping into issues of voice, neutrality, 
respect and trustworthiness, all on the same five category Likert-type response scale.
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The fourth scale represented respondents’ assessment of the legitimacy of the 
ombuds service, with three items covering perceived duty to comply with the ombuds 
decision, normative alignment, and legality (all, again, using five category Likert-type 
response scales).
Full question wordings from the items used in these measures, and results 
from the CFA modeling, are shown in Table 2. Three different models are shown—
note that full information likelihood estimation was used in each case, meaning that 
cases with some missing data were included in the analysis. Indicators were set to 
categorical throughout.
Model 1 in Table 2 shows results from a four-factor solution with no cross-
loadings. The approximate fit statistics indicate a good fit to the data (Hu and Bentler 
1999). There were however two issues with this model. First, the latent variables 
representing overall perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy were very 
strongly correlated (r=.95), suggesting poor discriminant validity—it seems that the 
survey respondents did not really draw a distinction between the procedural justice 
and legitimacy of the ombuds service. Accordingly, Model 2 in Table 2 shows results 
from a three-factor solution (again with no cross-loadings), where all the ombuds’ 
procedural justice and legitimacy items were allowed to load onto the same factor (see 
the shaded section of the table). The approximate fit statistics again indicate a good fit 
to the data, although the change in X2 values indicate a somewhat less well fitting 
model when compared with model 1. As such, it difficult to claim that the procedural 
justice and legitimacy of ombuds are separate constructs, in this dataset at least, and 
in any case they are so highly correlated it makes little sense to proceed while treating 
them as different from one another. To retain conceptual and analytic clarity we 
25
proceed simply with the measure of procedural justice, and we return to this issue in 
the conclusion.
The second issue with Model 1 in Table 2 is with the measures of staff and 
ombuds procedural justice, which were also highly correlated (r=.82). Model 3 in 
Table 2 therefore shows another three-factor solution, where this time all the 
procedural justice items were allowed to load onto one factor. In this case the 
resulting model is clearly a worse fit to the data than Model 1— the X2 change is very 
large and the RMSEA value is .1, well above the standard cut-off point of .06. We 
therefore proceed with the two distinct measures of procedural justice, and factor 
scores were extracted from Model 1 and saved for further analysis.17
The remaining explanatory variables were all single item measures. First was 
a measure of outcome favorability, derived from an item that asked “Was the outcome 
of your case in your favor?”, to which there were four possible responses: ‘yes’, ‘no’, 
‘partially’, and  ‘not sure’ (recall that cases where no outcome had been reached—or 
where respondents were ‘not sure’ of the outcome—were excluded from the analysis). 
Outcome favorability was therefore represented in the model by a pair of dummy 
variables representing positive and negative responses, with ‘partial’ responses as the 
reference category. Second, to complement the scale representing the extent to which 
respondents sought apology and restoration from the ombuds, a further dummy 
variable covered the extent to which they wanted “a financial award and/or my money 
back”. Responses to this item—wanted reward—were on a five-point scale (1 most 
important to 5 least important); responses of one or two were coded as one on the new 
dummy variable, with response in the remaining three categories comprising the 
reference category.
17
 Note that the ‘want fairness’ scale was only very weakly correlated with the other measures (r<.1 in 
every case).
26
Insert table 2 about here
Control variables
We also included a number of control measures in the models (all as dummy 
variables). These represent measures of potential importance to decision acceptance 
which may confound some of the explanatory variables described above, but for 
which we did not formulate any particular hypotheses. First, a further measure of 
respondents’ views of the process with which they were dealt was an item that 
assessed the extent to which they felt had control over the outcome—process control 
has been found to be an important correlate of procedural justice (e.g. Tyler and 
Blader 2000, chapter 8). Two dummy variables were used, the first coded one if the 
respondent felt they had control over the outcome and zero otherwise, the second 
coded one if the respondent did not feel they had any control, and zero otherwise (the 
reference category was those who were unsure in relation to this issue).
Two further variables covered aspects of respondents’ views of the outcome of 
their case, each entered into the models as pairs of dummy variables representing 
positive and negative responses with neutral/uncertain responses as the reference 
category. First was a measure of outcome expectation, derived from a survey item that 
asked “Was the outcome what you expected?” with responses on a four point scale 
(‘exactly’; ‘close’; ‘not sure what I expected’; ‘not at all’). Second was a measure of 
distributive justice, derived from an item that asked “Do you think that others with a 
similar complaint to yours receive the same outcome from the ombuds?”; responses 
were on a five point Likert-type scale.
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Finally, dummy variables for each of the individual ombuds services in the 
sample were also included in the models. We therefore estimated fixed effects models 
that allowed us to partial out the statistical effects of any unobserved variables, 




Table 3 shows that, overall, just over half (51%) of respondents were willing to accept 
the outcome of their case, with 39% unwilling (10% respondents said they were 
neither willing nor unwilling to accept the outcome—i.e. were at the mid-point of the 
underlying 5 point scale).
Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables are also shown in Table 3. 
Notably, outcome favorability was almost exactly split between those who felt they 
had obtained a favorable outcome and those who did not (the remainder were unsure). 
Similarly, while 50% of respondents obtained the outcome they expected, 40% did 
not (with the remainder again unsure). Other variables were more skewed – 
perceptions of distributive justice were positive, those of process control much less 
so. Obtaining a financial reward was important for just less than half of respondents 
(note that this variable was negatively correlated with want an apology/dignity—most 
respondents tended to want one or the other but not both, although there were 
exceptions).
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Table 3 also shows descriptive statistics for the three scales used in the 
analysis. Note all are mean centered, and there is little suggestion of significant skew 
in any.
Insert table 3 about here
Multivariate analysis
Since the response variable was a dichotomous measure we used binary logistic 
regression modeling to address hypotheses 1 to 5.18 Recall that the measure of 
outcome acceptance was coded such that one equaled self-assessed willingness to 
accept: a positive regression coefficient therefore indicates that an increase in the 
relevant explanatory variable was, controlling for the other variables in the model, 
associated with a greater probability of being willing to accept the outcome 
determined by the ombuds. A negative regression coefficient, by contrast, indicates 
that an increase in the explanatory variable was associated a lower probability of 
being willing to accept the outcome.
Results from four binary logistic models predicting outcome acceptance are 
shown in Table 4. Model 1 contains main effects only. We find, first, a very strong 
association between the procedural fairness of the ombuds and willingness to accept 
her/his decision (ß=1.66, p<.01). A clearer idea of the strength of this association can 
be gained by calculating fitted probabilities from the model.19 For example, holding 
18
 We also tested ordinal logistic regression models predicting the full five-category outcome 
acceptance variable. However these uniformly failed the Brant test of the proportional odds 
assumption, and we therefore proceeded with the dichotomous response variable.
19
 Using the prvalue function in Stata. Fitted or predicted probabilities are a way of describing 
the results of regression models, showing, here, the probability that an individual would be 
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all other variables at their mean the probability of a respondent perceiving the mean 
level of procedural justice being willing to accept the outcome was .58. For a 
respondent perceiving a low level of procedural justice, one standard deviation below 
the mean, the probability of being very willing to accept the outcome was just .17; but 
for a respondent perceiving a high level of procedural justice, one standard deviation 
above the mean, the probability of being very willing to accept the outcome was .91.
Second, perceptions of the nature of the outcome were associated with 
acceptance of it. Most notably, outcome favorability was strongly and independently 
associated with acceptance: those who received a favourable outcome were more 
willing to accept it (ß=1.8, p<.01), while those who received an unfavourable 
outcome were less willing (ß=-.86, p<.01). Fitted probabilities can again be used to 
illustrate the nature this relationship. Conditioning on the other variables in the model 
(again holding them at their mean), the probability of someone who obtained the 
outcome they wanted being willing to accept it was .85. By contrast, the probability of 
being willing to accept the outcome for someone who did not get the outcome they 
wanted was .28. Equally, though, and independent of their favorability, outcomes that 
were not expected were less likely to be accepted than those that were.
Third, respondents who felt they had control over the outcome were no more 
likely to accept it, and those who felt they did not have control were no less likely to 
accept, than those who were unsure about this element of their experience. This 
finding corresponds with results from many other procedural justice studies (e.g. Lind 
et al. 1997; Tyler and Blader 2000; Tyler and Huo 2002), which have found control 
issues to have no independent statistical effect on outcome acceptance once 
procedural justice is taken into account.
willing to accept the outcome conditional on different scores or values on the explanatory 
variables of interest.
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There was no association between perceptions of distributive justice and 
outcome acceptance once the other variables in the model were taken into account, 
nor were those who wanted fairness, or financial compensation, more or less likely to 
accept the outcome. Finally, conditioning on the other variables in the model, there 
was no consistent association between the type of ombuds service involved 
(public/private) and decision acceptance. Respondents were less likely to be willing to 
accept the decisions of some ombuds compared with others, but both public and 
private services fell into this category.
Insert table 4 about here
Models 2 and 3 in Table 5 tested the interactions between reasons for 
complaining to the ombuds and procedural justice. Recall that we hypothesized 
procedural justice would be a more important predictor of outcome acceptance for 
those who wanted fairness from the outset, while it would be less important for those 
who wanted a cash reward. We find support for the former idea but not the latter. 
Model 2 shows that the interaction between procedural justice and ‘wanted fairness’ 
(reward*PJ) was positive and significant, while the reward*PJ coefficient in Model 3 
was not significant. It seems that procedural justice may have been more important 
for those who wanted fairness from the process, but no less important a predictor of 
outcome acceptance for those who wanted financial compensation.
Model 4 tested the hypothesis that procedural fairness would be a more 
important predictor of outcome acceptance for users of public ombuds. However we 
find little evidence to support this idea. Compared with the reference category 
(Private 1), users of the public ombuds services included in the model did not seem to 
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place any more emphasis on procedural justice, and there was no consistent link 
between the nature of the ombuds service involved (public/private) and the 
importance of procedural justice to its users.
When is the procedure experienced as fair?
Thus far we have treated the procedural justice of the ombuds and the outcomes they 
are able to deliver as separate aspects or components of people’s experiences. This is 
of course a key claim of the procedural justice model—that process and outcome are 
separate factors, and that a fair process can offset an unfavorable outcome. Yet, as 
discussed above, there are reasons to suggest that in the context of ombuds services 
the line between these two factors may be considerably more blurred than in the case 
of, for example, the courts or policing (Tyler and Huo 2002). We therefore estimated 
a second set of regression models, this time with ombuds procedural justice as the 
response variable—since this was an interval/ratio level measure we switched to 
linear regression. Explanatory variables were the same set of process and outcome 
concerns used above and, in addition, the measure of staff procedural justice. Results 
are shown in Table 4.
Model 5 in Table 5 contains just the dummies representing the various 
services and outcome favorability. The latter was very strongly associated with 
perceptions of procedural justice—those who received a favorable outcome tended to 
have more favorable views of ombuds procedural justice (ß=.41, p<.01), while those 
who received an unfavorable outcome tended to have less favorable views (ß=-.45, 
p<.01). Note the large R2 value for this model (.49); nearly half the variation in 
perceptions of ombuds procedural justice can be explained by knowing just the 
ombuds involved and whether the outcome was favorable or not—and most of this 
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was down to outcome favorability. In a model excluding the ombuds dummies (not 
shown) R2 = .45.
Model 6 adds the other process and outcome measures. Conditioning on the 
other variables in the model, those who experienced little or no control over the 
outcome (ß=-.34, p<01) and who received an outcome they were not expecting (ß=-
.24, p<01) tended to see the ombuds as less procedurally fair. However there was no 
independent association between distributive justice and ombuds procedural justice. 
Note that in this model the coefficients for outcome favorability are much reduced in 
size—some of the association between this measure and procedural justice was 
explained by process control and expectation.
Finally, model 7 in Table 5 adds the measure of staff procedural justice. 
Conditioning on the other variables in the model, there was a strong association 
between the perceived procedural fairness of particular ombuds staff and the 
perceived procedural fairness of the service as a whole (ß=.57, p<.01); note also that 
the R2 value jumps to .76. Equally, though, even taking into account the way 
respondents were treated by particular staff members, those who received an 
unfavorable outcome, an outcome they did not expect, or who felt they had no control 
over the process were still less likely to think the ombuds service as a whole 
procedurally fair.
It is important to note that we are not claiming that outcome favorability, or 
any of the other variables in these models, ‘causes’ perceptions of procedural justice; 
it is clear these associations are all likely to be bi-directional. Most obviously, the 
communication between parties that generates a sense of procedural justice may shape 
complainants’ expectations in relation to the outcome of their case. Treating people 
fairly may also encourage in them a sense that they are in control of the process 
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(Tyler and Blader 2000). What our results do suggest, however, is that concerns about 
outcome and process are heavily intertwined in the ombuds context, and that it is 
highly likely people infer the quality of one from the quality of the other.
Insert table 5 about here
Discussion
We presented six hypotheses to test if the model of procedural justice applies to the 
ombuds context. The focus was on understanding motivations for decision acceptance 
in users of the ombuds system. First, our results suggest that the ‘standard’ procedural 
justice model works well in this context: procedural justice is very strongly associated 
with decision acceptance (Hypothesis 1). Procedural justice is also very strongly 
associated with legitimacy—so much so, in fact, that is unclear whether, in this 
context, they constitute separate constructs (separate aspects of the way respondents 
experienced and thought about the ombuds service they encountered). We were not 
therefore able to test Hypothesis 2, although it almost certainly true in a general sense 
that here, as elsewhere, legitimacy predicts decision acceptance (since procedural 
justice does). However, unlike other procedural justice studies conducted in other 
contexts, we find that outcome favorability is also a predictor of decision acceptance 
(Hypothesis 3). Support was also found for Hypothesis 4a, which posited that 
procedural justice would be more important to those who wanted fairness from the 
outset of the process; however Hypothesis 4b, which suggested that procedural justice 
would be less important for those who sought reward or refund, was not supported by 
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our analysis. We also found little support for Hypothesis 5, which posited that 
procedural justice should be more important to users of state-funded ombuds services. 
Finally, we find that, as suggested by Hypothesis 6, there is a strong 
association between outcome favorability and perceptions of fairness. Controlling for 
the quality of respondents’ interactions with particular ombuds staff, those who 
received a positive outcome were significantly more likely to believe the procedure, 
as a whole, was fair.20 Nevertheless an important finding from this analysis is that the 
quality of interaction with ombuds staff was a strong influence on individuals’ 
procedural and outcome perceptions.
All of this said, we can return to the broader question posed at the outset of 
this paper, of where the ombuds sits within people’s value system, in relation to both 
our findings and existing procedural justice literature. Outcome favorability predicted 
perceptions of procedural justice to a larger extent than is often found elsewhere (for 
example in the courts and police). One interpretation of this is that unfamiliarity with 
ombuds services may be an important factor shaping people’s experiences of them.21 
This would be in line with van den Bos’ (1997) finding that if people are unsure about 
what to expect from a process, the perceived fairness of the outcome has larger weight 
in their assessments of the fairness of the process. Moreover, and again unlike much 
procedural justice research in other contexts, we find that other factors predict 
decision acceptance independent of perceptions of procedural justice—namely, 
receiving an unexpected outcome. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we find 
very significant overlap between perceptions of procedural justice, outcome 
20
 We cannot rule out the possibility of a ‘halo effect’ arising from the ‘victory’ of a favorable 
outcome, which could lead respondents to think the process was fair in retrospect. 
35
favorability and outcome expectation. These seemingly diverse aspects of the 
experience appear, in this context, to be mutually constitutive of one another.
Viewing these findings through the lens of the legal socialization literature 
may provide some valuable insights. For example, it could be that the location of 
ombuds services within people’s concept of the justice system is uncertain. People’s 
values of law are learned and developed over time; they are not only formed through 
direct interaction with an authority. As a much less visible service or institution it may 
be that the experiences of the ombuds are not subject to the same enduring social 
conditioning effects as the courts or police. Many or even most people have some 
form of understanding and acceptance of these representatives of legal authority, and 
thus some expectations of how they should behave and of the outcomes they are 
meant to secure—broadly, justice and security. People may be less clear about how 
ombuds are meant to behave and the outcomes they are intended to secure, making 
them more sensitive to the multiple aspects of the process through which they interact 
with these services. These questions would be a fruitful area for future enquiry.
Another possibility is of course that in the ombuds context people are simply 
more instrumental than seems to often be the case in criminal justice contexts. That is, 
it may be that users of ombuds services did understand the process and knew what 
they wanted – which was their money back or getting the outcome they desired. Our 
analysis cannot distinguish whether this was in fact the case (although it seems to us 
prima facie believable to claim that most people are not familiar with ADR 
processes), and this again would be an interesting area for future exploration.
Despite this procedural justice remained arguably the most important factor 
predicting, in the current case, decision acceptance. In addition, the legitimacy of the 
ombuds appeared to collapse into perceptions of procedural justice, leaving us with 
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little choice but to concentrate in our analysis on procedural justice alone. On this 
basis it might be argued that, to the extent that people are uncertain about what 
ombuds services are intended to do, or find it difficult to ‘fit’ them into their value 
systems, procedural justice might be the best way to foster such understanding—not 
least because it seems procedural justice is just as strongly associated with legitimacy 
here as elsewhere.
Study limitations
We should note the limitations of our study. While the response rate was high, for a 
mail out/return sampling strategy, a rate of 17% implies our findings are unlikely to 
be truly generalizable to the population of users of the ombuds services involved. The 
fact that we used a cross-sectional survey design precludes any attempt at causal 
inference and means we are unable to model processes of change. 
More specifically, the closeness of procedural justice and legitimacy in our 
data may be as much a product of the survey questions used as one of conceptual 
overlap. This was, as far as we know, the first study of the users of ombudsman 
services to field such measures, and we were therefore reliant on existing measures, 
primarily from the criminological literature. Future work might profitably attempt to 
refine the concept of legitimacy in this context, not least to probe whether it is as 
close to procedural justice as we have found here.
Our primary outcome measure was also somewhat limited in its scope. 
Respondents were simply asked whether they were willing to accept the outcome. To 
be sure, this is an important indicator, which taps into people’s state of mind upon 
hearing the outcome of their case. However, it might have been preferable to also 
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include a behavioral indicator of acceptance, such as whether complainants sought a 
review of the decision or outcome.
Conclusions 
This paper set out to explore whether the theory of procedural justice could explain, 
as it does in other contexts, why people accept decisions handed down by authorities. 
The authority studied, an ombuds, is an interesting hybrid in the justice system. It is a 
body that provides ADR outside of the national court system, an additional path to 
accessing justice.
We asked what motivates people to accept decisions made by an ombuds. We 
found that outcome favorability and procedural justice are key factors shaping 
decision acceptance; however, outcome favorability has a more important weighting 
in this context than is often the case in other studies, for example of policing. Further, 
we found that procedural justice and legitimacy may not be empirically separable in 
this context. 
We conclude that there are many factors that motivate people to accept 
ombuds decisions. It may be that the ombuds institution has yet to establish itself in 
peoples’ minds as an institution similar in nature to the police and courts. While this 
process is not likely to ever be complete – since ombuds are by definition different to 
more overtly ‘legal’ institutions – greater familiarization might lead to an increased 
focus on procedural justice among users of ombuds services.  Equally, however, it 
may simply be that in this context people are more outcome-focused than seems to be 
the case in more overtly criminal justice settings. More research on these questions is 
needed. Our data did show, however, that staff procedural justice had a significant 
statistical effect on people’s overall perceptions of fairness of the ombuds, and 
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therefore on decision acceptance, underlining that here, as elsewhere, the fairness of a 
process is likely to be an important factor shaping readiness to accept its conclusion.  
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Table 1: overview of UK ombuds and their workload in 2014 
Public sector ombuds
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Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman make final decisions on 
complaints that have not been resolved by the National Health System (NHS) in England, UK 
government departments and other UK public organizations. They investigated 2,199 
complaints in 2014.
Local Government Ombudsman deals with complaints about councils and some 
other authorities and organisations, including education admissions appeal panels, and adult 
social care providers (such as care homes and home care providers). They received 11,725 
complaints in 2014.
Private sector ombuds
Financial Ombudsman Services look at complaints about most financial problems 
involving: PPI (payment protection insurance), banking, insurance, mortgages, credit cards and 
store cards, loans and credit, payday lending and debt collecting, pensions, savings and 
investments, hire purchase and pawnbroking, money transfer, financial advice stocks, shares, 
unit trusts and bonds. They handled 2,357,374 initial enquiries and complaints from consumers 
– almost 8,000 each working day.  Around one in five of the initial consumer enquiries received 
turned into a formal dispute.
Ombudsman Services: Energy looks at problems with energy bills; problems 
resulting from an energy company’s sales activity; problems resulting from switching gas or 
electricity supplier; physical problems relating to the supply of energy to a home or small 
business, such as power cuts and connections; micro generation and feed-in tariffs (FITs); and 
problems relating to the provision of services under the Green Deal. They handled 61,019 
complaints in 2914.
Ombudsman Services: Communications helps consumers with billing problems; 
problems resulting from a company’s sales activity; problems resulting from switching from one 
company to another; poor service, for example, failing to act on a request; premium rate services 
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(PRS); pay TV; voice-on-demand (VOD); and mobile phone handsets. They resolved 15,173 
complaints in 2014.
Legal Ombudsman helps to resolve legal service disputes: Wills and probate remained 
the third highest source of complaints on 13% followed closely by personal injury 10% and 
litigation 9.5%. They resolved a total of 8,055 cases in 2014.
Table 2
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Latent Constructs and Measures








Wanted fairness from the process
How important were the following in your 
decision to complain?
Getting someone to listen to me 0.64 0.41 0.64 0.41 0.64 0.41
Getting an apology 0.70 0.50 0.70 0.50 0.70 0.49
Preventing others from having the same problems 
as myself 0.57 0.33 0.57 0.33 0.57 0.33
Being treated with respect and dignity 0.66 0.44 0.66 0.43 0.66 0.44
To get an impartial view on my problem 0.76 0.58 0.76 0.57 0.76 0.58
Staff procedural justice
What was your impression of the STAFF when 
you first contacted [Ombuds]
Helpful 0.92 0.85 0.92 0.85 0.84 0.70
Understood my problem 0.93 0.86 0.93 0.86 0.84 0.71
Seemed to know what they were talking about 0.90 0.80 0.90 0.80 0.82 0.67
Treated me with respect and courtesy 0.94 0.88 0.94 0.88 0.87 0.76
Seemed trustworthy 0.83 0.69 0.83 0.68 0.76 0.58
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Seemed interested in hearing my story 0.88 0.77 0.88 0.77 0.79 0.62
Seemed unbiased and neutral 0.87 0.75 0.87 0.75 0.79 0.62
  
Ombuds procedural justice   
Dealing with the [Ombuds] … would you agree 
that:   
… the time it took to reach a decision was 
appropriate 0.76 0.58 0.76 0.57 0.74 0.55
... you had your say in the procedure 0.86 0.74 0.85 0.73 0.85 0.71
... the staff understood your problem 0.94 0.88 0.93 0.86 0.92 0.85
… the staff took you seriously 0.95 0.90 0.94 0.89 0.93 0.87
… the staff were neutral 0.88 0.77 0.87 0.76 0.87 0.75
… you were treated with respect and courtesy 0.91 0.82 0.90 0.82 0.89 0.80
  
Ombuds legitimacy   
Which of the following statements applies to you?   
I feel a moral obligation to follow the 
[ombudsman's] recommendation 0.60 0.36 0.57 0.33 0.593 0.351
The [ombudsman] is acting according to the law 0.85 0.72 0.81 0.66 0.847 0.718
The people dealing with my case seemed to have 
the same sense of right and wrong as me 0.94 0.88 0.88 0.78 0.94 0.884
Fit statistics
Chi-square 526.2 654.8 2166.6
Degrees of freedom 181 184 184
p-value <.0005 <.0005 <.0005
RMSEA 0.04 0.06 0.10
CLI 0.99 0.99 0.97
TFI 0.99  0.99  0.96  
n=1,147
Table 3: Variables used in the analysis
Percentages
 Yes No Unsure/ 
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partial/neither
Outcome acceptance? 51 39 10
Outcome favorable? 39 38 23
Outcome expected? 50 40 10
Distributive justice? 64 8 28
Process control? 23 64 13
Complained for financial reward? 46 54 N/A
Scales
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Staff procedural justice 0.03 0.74 -1.82 1.32
Ombudsman procedural justice 0.00 0.72 -2.13 1.32
Desired apology and dignity 0.01 0.56 -1.94 1.59
Table 4: Results from binary logistic regression models predicting outcome 
acceptance
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 ß se(ß) ß se(ß) ß se(ß) ß se(ß)
Ombudsman Services (ref: private1)
Private 2 -1.84** 0.66 -2.01** 0.67 -1.86** 0.66 -1.68+ 0.89
Private 3 0 0.56 -0.01 0.58 0 0.56 -0.34 0.55
Private 4 -0.12 0.38 -0.2 0.38 -0.13 0.38 -0.33 0.41
Public 1 -1.01** 0.35 -1.05** 0.35 -1.01** 0.35 -1.02** 0.35
Public 2 -0.73+ 0.38 -0.80* 0.39 -0.72+ 0.38 -0.78+ 0.4
Reasons for complaint
Wanted fairness 0.02 0.22 0.16 0.23 0.02 0.22 0 0.23
Financial reward (ref: no)
Yes 0.13 0.25 0.15 0.25 0.12 0.25 0.13 0.25
Perceptions of outcome
Outcome expected (ref: not sure what expected)
Yes 0.5 0.36 0.43 0.36 0.5 0.36 0.5 0.36
No -0.80* 0.35 -0.86* 0.36 -0.79* 0.35 -0.85* 0.36
Outcome favorability (ref: partial)
Yes 1.80** 0.32 1.81** 0.33 1.80** 0.33 1.76** 0.33
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No -0.86** 0.32 -0.92** 0.33 -0.86** 0.32 -0.87** 0.33
Distributive justice (ref: not sure)
Yes -0.05 0.26 -0.1 0.26 -0.06 0.26 -0.08 0.26
No -0.06 0.49 -0.02 0.49 -0.08 0.49 -0.09 0.5
Perceptions of process
Process control (ref: not sure)
Yes -0.05 0.26 -0.1 0.26 -0.06 0.26 -0.08 0.26
No -0.06 0.49 -0.02 0.49 -0.08 0.49 -0.09 0.5




Private 2 * OPJ 5.43 3.6
Private 3 * OPJ -0.8 1.06
Private 4 * OPJ 1.44+ 0.8
Public 1 * OPJ 0.52 0.69
Public 2 * OPJ 0.35 0.74
Constant 0.75 0.55 0.88 0.56 0.77 0.55 0.84 0.56
n 1143  1143  1143  1143  
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01
Table 5: Results from linear regression models predicting perceptions of ombuds 
procedural justice (high=more)
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
 ß se(ß) ß se(ß) ß se(ß)
Ombudsman Services (ref: private1)
Private 2 -0.26** -0.08 -0.22** -0.08 -0.17** -0.06
Private 3 -0.15+ -0.08 -0.13+ -0.08 0.01 -0.06
Private 4 0.16** -0.05 0.21** -0.04 0.11** -0.03
Public 1 -0.19** -0.05 -0.16** -0.05 -0.07* -0.03
Public 2 -0.36** -0.05 -0.35** -0.05 -0.15** -0.04
Outcome favorability (ref: partial)
Yes 0.41** -0.05 0.17** -0.05 0.12** -0.04
No -0.45** -0.05 -0.32** -0.05 -0.15** -0.04
Outcome expected (ref: not sure what 
expected)
Yes -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04
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No -0.24** -0.05 -0.14** -0.04
Distributive justice (ref: not sure)
Yes 0.06+ -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
No -0.09 -0.06 0 -0.04
Process control (ref: not sure)
Yes 0.09+ -0.05 0.04 -0.04
No -0.34** -0.05 -0.17** -0.04
Staff Procedural justice 0.57** -0.02
Constant 0.11* -0.05 0.45** -0.08 0.23** -0.06
R2 0.49 0.56 0.76
n 1143  1143  1143  
